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LEAD ARTICLE
THE PERFECT FAKE: CREATIVITY, FORGERY,
ART AND THE LAW
Michael J. Clark, J.D., Ph.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
... [I]f it is later proven that the painting had been
wrongly attributed to a master when it was the work
of a student, what is left but the painting?
- Scott Hodes, 'Legal Rights in the Art and
Collectors' World' '
Art [is] the truly metaphysical activity of man....
[T]he existence of the world is justified only as an
aesthetic phenomenon.
- Friedrich Nietszche, 'The Birth of Tragedy'2
The more total society becomes, the greater the
reification of the mind and the more paradoxical its
effort to escape reification on its own ... To write
poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.
* Assistant Professor of Literature, Film and Law, Department of Engkish,
Portland State University.
1. SCOTT HODES, LEGAL RIGHTS IN THE ART AND COLLECTORS' WORLD 44
(1986).
2. FRIEDRICH NIETZCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY 22 (Walter Kaufmann
trans.) (1967).
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- Theodor Adorno, 'Prisms'3
Great art remains stable and unobscure because the
feelings that it awakens are independent of time and
place, because its kingdom is not of this world.
- Clive Bell, 'Art'4
... [A] 11 the rulers are the heirs of those who
conquered before them.. .Whoever has emerged
victorious participates to this day in the triumphal
procession in which present rulers step over those
who are lying prostrate. According to traditional
practice, the spoils are carried along in the
procession. They are called cultural treasures, and
a historical materialist views them with cautious
detachment. For without exception the cultural
treasures he surveys have an origin which he cannot
contemplate without horror. They owe their
existence not only to the efforts of the great minds
who have created them, but also to the anonymous
toil of their contemporaries. There is no document
of civilization which is not at the same time a
document of barbarism; barbarism taints also the
manner in which it was transmitted from one owner
to another.
- Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of
History5
Legal concerns surrounding the forgery of artworks are often
deeply vexing, largely because such questions inevitably demand
the kind of interdisciplinary discussions that the law is ill suited to
3. THEODOR ADORNO, PRIsMs 34 (Sherry and Samuel Weber trans.) (1990).
4. CLIVE BELL, ART 102 (1949).
5. Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History VII, in
ILLUMINATIONS 256 (Harry Zohn trans., Hannah Arendt ed.) (1968).
[Vol. XV: I
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undertake. For example, questions about the forgery of paintings
invariably raise questions about the very elements that constitute
"originality" and "authenticity" from an artistic perspective.6
Although such terms have grown to possess specific legal
meanings, particularly in the area of copyright law, they are more
properly suited to the aesthetic dimension.
Such questions place legal practitioners in a difficult spot. In
spite of the generally omnivorous and insatiable character of legal
thinking, forays into the world of art and aesthetics have often
been greeted with skepticism by the very lawyers and judges
charged with such ventures. The reasons have much to do with a
series of unstated presumptions about the role of art in its relation
with the larger "society." That is, many hold that the artistic
sphere is by nature exempt from rules that operate in other social
arenas.7 Prohibitions against censorship are just one manifestation
of such beliefs. But there is a simpler, more straightforward
reason for the tendency of judicial reason to avoid substantive
discussions of works of art as well-a lack of expertise. Judges
are, in general, well versed in legal reasoning and history, but may
well be generally ignorant of the central issues, themes, and
historical circumstances that drive the art world. In this regard,
law's relation to art is much (though not wholly) like law's relation
to religion: to the largest extent possible (and at least in principle),
it adheres to a position of carefully guarded non-interference. This
attitude is famously articulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes in
Bleistein, v. Donaldson Lithography Co., where he supported a
plaintiff's right to copyright a circus poster:
6. Copyright law demands that works of authorship (i.e., anything owing its
existence to an author) possess a de minimis level of originality in order to
receive protection from infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a).
7. The strongest statement of art's autonomy is found in Immanuel Kant's
Critique of Judgment, where he points out that judgments of art (unlike more
pragmatically concerned judgments) are the product of an "entirely disinterested
satisfaction or dissatisfaction." Such a posture underscores the belief that art is




Clark: The Perfect Fake: Creativity, Forgery, Art and the Law
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J. ART & ENT. LA W
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.
At the one extreme, some works of genius would be
sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned
the new language in which their author spoke...
At the other end, copyright would be denied to a
public less educated than the judge. 8
Justice Holmes' admonition has served as a touchstone of
American copyright law for almost a century, but it has
implications far beyond the particular circumstances it addressed.
First, his elitism is apparent: He presumes that the "public" (who
he apparently assumes has less well-developed aesthetic
sensibilities than other segments of the population) would reject
any art form with which they were not wholly familiar.9 Further,
he assumes that judges - given their education and tolerance -
would be more open to new forms. This is a highly dubious
presupposition. But most important for our purposes here, Justice
Holmes points out perhaps the central aesthetic and legal paradox
regarding forgery of works of art: the question of the creative act
and its embodiment as the "signature" of an authentic work. When
pressed, one finds that the law is indeed ill equipped to understand
the forgery of works of art qua art. Or, to use a slightly different
formulation, we might say that law must engage in a form of
translation of the work itself into a fungible commodity when
concerned with the forgery of artworks. To be addressed
8. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing, Inc., 23 S. Ct. 298 (1903).
9. One wonders, for instance, what Justice Holmes would have thought of
rap or hip-hop music. The innovative and anti-elitist elements of rap and hip-
hop are apparent to anyone who has ever listened to such music, and its
appreciation is obvious to the uneducated public that mills about in the
background of Justice Holmes' world. Indeed, it is likely that an "educated"
judge would be more likely to be "repulsed" by some of the elements of the
most radical moments in rap.
[Vol. XV: I
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appropriately, art must become an object of property and contract
in the eyes of the law.
In what follows I shall attempt to discuss three separate elements
in legal and aesthetic considerations of the forgery of paintings.
First, I will discuss the question of the authentic work itself. In
that section I offer various definitions of forgery, as well as of
ancillary terms such as authenticity, originality, and creativity. My
central concern will be the development of an aesthetic
understanding of genuineness as a component in our apprehension
of a work of art, as well as aesthetic theories which address the
question of what art does for us. Second, I will raise questions
about authenticity or genuineness in an era of mechanical
reproduction. What, for instance, do we make of mass-produced
artworks of the sort produced by Andy Warhol in the sixties and
seventies of the twentieth century? How does Warhol's work
challenge notions of aesthetic authenticity? In that context, I will
briefly discuss Walter Benjamin's famous essay, "The Work of
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," where he argues that
although the perfectly reproduced work of art (as in a reproduction
of the Mona Lisa) may fulfill the central demands of an aesthetic
experience of the work, there is still something lacking - a
nebulous element he calls the work's "aura." I will also address
some troubling questions raised by Nelson Goodman in his book
Languages of Art, particularly his questions about the relevance of
a "perfect fake" to the act of aesthetic appreciation. Finally, I will
discuss the specifically legal responses to incidents of forgery,
emphasizing the (not altogether unreasonable) translations in
perception of the work of art that legal remedies for forgery
demand; and I will also discuss some important questions about
intent to deceive as a component in forgery cases.
The latter point is of central importance, for the perception of an
artwork is on some level an act of faith and historical trust. To
perceive a work of art is not only to look at pigments on a canvas,
nor is it merely to perceive technical arrangements of color and
shape. It is also a way to perceive various histories or traditions.
During a time when histories and traditions are being eradicated by
commercial and political forces far beyond the understanding or
2004]
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control of ordinary individuals, it is a charming twist that the law -
which must convert artworks into commercial entities in order to
protect the ownership interests of private buyers - should serve to
protect those traditions. Such are the ironies of law, ironies that
seem to multiply when it comes into contact with art.
II. WHAT IS WRONG WITH FORGERY?
A. Aesthetic Background
From a strictly formal aesthetic perspective, the fact that a work
of art is an exact duplication of another work should be of no
import. A simple scenario suffices to prove this point: Late one
night thieves enter the Louvre and replace Leonardo's Mona Lisa
with an exact visual and tactile reproduction. The next day,
thousands of museum-goers shuffle by, stopping for a moment to
admire the enigmatic character of the model's smile, perhaps
joking about the way the model's eyes seem to follow the viewer
throughout the room. In short, the audience has "experienced" the
Mona Lisa. Or have they?
While this scenario seems to raise more questions than it could
ever answer, it nonetheless shows that any conclusions about the
problem will depend in large part upon how we think about art.
Put differently, we might say that every perception of a work of art
entails some kind of theory about what art does and should do. To
view a work of art is to have (either overtly or unconsciously) a
theory of art.
This point may be made more clear by outlining the general
parameters those theories may take. In his study of romanticism
and aesthetics, The Mirror and the Lamp, ° Meyer Abrams argues
that there are four primary coordinates for aesthetic appreciation -
the mimetic, pragmatic, expressive, and formalist." Abrams
diagrams these coordinates in the following fashion:
10. M.H. ABRAMS, THE MIRROR AND THE LAMP 6 (1953).
11. Id. at 6.
[Vol. XV: I
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(Formalist or Objective theory)
Audience Artist
(Pragmatic theory) (Expressive theory)
Abrams' point is to illustrate that various and often quite distinct
demands can be made by the perceiver of an artwork. For the
mimetic theorist, for instance, the work of art is judged according
to the degree with which it is able to imitate the world around it -
verisimilitude is the central critical principle.12 Such a perspective
might endorse realism in its most extreme form, as in the stark
"superrealism" of sculptor John De Andrea. 3  The central
characteristic of a work judged from this perspective is the
technical skill or craft of the artist: how well has she portrayed the
external world? The idea of the artist imparting some unique
ingredient to the artwork is absent here; indeed, such addition by
the artist would entail a flaw in the work.
The pragmatic theorist asks that the work do something for its
audience. 4 The work should teach, or inform, or emotionally
12. Id. at 7.
13. De Andrea's work takes the circumstance of persons in everyday life
reproduces them in sculptural forms that are virtually indistinguishable from the
real thing. See EDWARD LUCIE-SMITH, ART TODAY 481 (1989).
14. ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 14.
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move us. This theory finds its origins in the work of Aristotle,
who in his classic work, On the Art of Poetry, introduced the
famous theory of catharsis: a demand that the work of art move us
emotionally, purge us of these emotions, and ultimately, by that
process of immersion in the emotional life of the work, make us
more rational. 5 The criteria for judgment is thus the distance
between what we think a work ought to do and what a particular
work in fact does.' 6
The expressive theorist holds that work of art is the embodiment
of the artist's powerfully held feelings. 7 The work is thus a signal
of the artist's innermost secrets. This attitude is embodied most
profoundly in the work of romantic artists and is probably the
prevailing attitude toward works of art today. According to
Wordsworth (probably the most influential theoretical
representative of expressive theories), a work of art is "the
spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings."' 8 As such, the viewer
of a work of art is in some sense exposed to the particular
circumstances of the author at the moment of the work's creation.
Finally, the formalist theorist attempts to look at the work in the
absence of any external forces. 9 That is, she attempts to isolate
the work from any circumstances that surrounded its production,
history, and current status. For the formalist, what counts is
simply what is on the canvas - how the images, colors, shapes, and
dynamics of the work hold together.
The question of how one responds to a forged artwork depends
to a large extent upon which of these four aesthetic perspectives
one occupies. To some extent, the mimetic and pragmatic critics
would only be partially troubled by the knowledge that a work has
a "perfect fake." In both cases, the essential aesthetic demand
made by the viewer would be met. This is even more strongly the
15. ARISTOTLE, ON THE ART OF POETRY 49 (T.S. Dorsch trans.) (1965).
16. Id. at 50. See also MONROE BEARDSLEY, AESTHETICS FROM CLASSICAL
GREECE TO THE PRESENT 48 (1990).
17. ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 20.
18. William Wordsworth, preface to LYRICAL BALLADS, 2D. EDITION, in
HAZARD ADAMS, CRITICAL THEORY SINCE PLATO 437,441 (1992).
19. ABRAMS, supra note 10, at 23.
[Vol. XV: 1
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case with the formalist, for whom a work is an embodiment of
images and symbols separate from historical contingency. Indeed,
formalist critics argue that it is only from such a perspective that
the notion of the "timeless" masterpiece can make any sense. It is
only the work - what we see or experience on canvas - that
matters. All else is history, or confusion, or extraneous data.
Philosopher of art Alfred Lessing characterizes this strict formalist
position in the following:
Considering a work of art aesthetically superior
because it is genuine, or inferior because it is
forged, has little to do with aesthetic judgment or
criticism .... [I]t is impossible to understand what
is wrong with a forgery unless it be first made quite
clear that the answer will not be in terms of its
aesthetic worth."
Lessing points out a number of other important elements
surrounding the concept and practice of forgery. First, he says, we
should note that the concept of forgery implies a concept of
authenticity - the one cannot exist without the other." Although
this may seem obvious on its face, the idea of an authentic work
(with the special characteristics of unique authorship, history, and
symbolic force) is a relatively recent phenomenon: an artwork did
not always circulate as a manifestation of individual authorship,
nor was the question of its "genuineness" raised. Indeed, the
origins of forgery as such can be traced back to a relatively recent
period in the history of art." Furthermore, it is only with the
growth of capital transfers of painting that a non-aesthetic impulse
for forgery came about. 3  In the classical era, for instance,
"copying" was a common and unremarkable artistic activity. It is
20. Alfred Lessing, Wat is Wrong with Forgery? in DENIS DuTroN, THE
FORGER'S ART 58, 59 (1983).
21. Lawrence Scott Bauman, Legal Control of the Fabrication and
Marketing of Fake Paintings, 24 STAN. L. REv. 930-31 (1972).
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only in an era when artworks become exchangeable as
commodities that the concept of the forged artwork arises.24
Second, Lessing points out that forgery is a negative concept.25
It refers not to any specific characteristics that a work possesses,
but to those characteristics that the work fails to possess. In short,
it implies the absence of pedigree.
Lessing concludes from such observations that the concept of
forgery is a moral claim that has only post hoc effects upon
aesthetic claims. It is by no means clear that a work of art is
inferior, qua work of art, simply because it is a forgery:
The plain fact is that aesthetically it makes no difference
whether a work of art is authentic or a forgery, and instead of
being embarrassed at having praised a forgery, critics should have
the courage of their convictions and take pride in having praised
work of beauty.26
Expressive theories of art provide a stark contrast to the
formalist position. For the expressive theorist, the work of art
embodies the specific historical and personal circumstances of the
author at the time of the work's creation. As such, the work is
more than the formal concatenation of visible images; it is an
historical artifact as well. For the expressive theorist, who is
speaking, from what perspective, matters as much as what is being
said. Indeed, what is being said can only be understood by
knowing who spoke. In short, the work of art is a bundle of
elements not restricted to the four corners of the work itself. It
embodies extra-aesthetic materials, or what philosopher of art
Walter Benjamin calls the work's "aura."27
Obviously, the aesthetic response of an expressive theorist to a
fake will be markedly different than that of the formalist. The
latter assiduously attempts to expel any extra-textual or extra-
aesthetic concerns from the process of aesthetic reception, while
the former includes the work's conditions of production and
24. Lessing, supra note 20, at 58.
25. Id. at 62.
26. Id.
27. Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction, in ILLUMINATIONS 217, 220 (1968).
[Vol. XV: I
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history, as well as the name and importance of the author, as
essential elements in the process of aesthetic reception. The result
of such differences in approach and interpretation lead to a number
of differences in the response one has to the forgery of artworks,
especially when based on strictly aesthetic grounds. Most
importantly, the formalist may not care if a work is a perfect fake
or not; what matters is how the work looks, not who made it,
owned it, or signed it.28
B. Commodification of the Work ofArt
In the contemporary art world it has become virtually impossible
to separate aesthetic from economic concerns. 29 As was suggested
earlier, this transformation in our understanding of an artwork is
irretrievably intertwined with the advent of capitalism, whereby all
objects of production (in this case painting) became convertible
into a monetary value. Current-day obsession with the sale value
of a particular artwork evinces this intermingling of aesthetic and
monetary criteria of judgment, almost certainly to the detriment of
our relation with artworks themselves.
The dramatic increases in the value of artworks in the past two
decades provide further evidence of the transformation of our
28. The flip-side of this situation can be found in works associated with
celebrities. A recent auction of part of the collection of Barbara Streisand saw
artworks selling at what experienced collectors felt were extraordinarily high
prices. The reason for the high prices was found in the fact that the works'
provenance could be traced at some point to Streisand herself. In this case the
value of an artwork became a function of celebrity. See Streisand Collection on
the Market, NEW YORK TIMES, July 7, 1994, at 32.
29. The fundamental intertwining of economics and painting (in particular)
was exemplified by a New York City Department of Consumer Affairs order to
post prices on all artworks in commercial galleries. The policy was intended to
assist consumers in an arena traditionally filled with arcane and snobbish rules
of behavior. As one might expect, the proposal was lambasted by gallery
owners, dealers, and members of the inner circle of art as "creat[ing] a
psychological barrier that inhibits the viewer from reacting to work on its own
merits." Douglas McGill, Galleries are in Distress over Order to Start Posting
Prices on Artworks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1988, at C20.
2004)
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relationship to such works. Works of art appear on the front pages
of major newspapers not as a consequence of their aesthetic virtues
(ostensibly the reason they matter to us in the first place) but only
when their sale value rockets skyward. In 1990, Van Gogh's
"Portrait of Dr. Gachet" was sold at Christie's auction house in
New York City for the sum of $82.5 million.3" Immediately
afterward, Renoir's "Au Moulin de la Galette" was sold for $78.1
million.3 Much less well-known works saw their values inflate
wildly during the 1980's and 1990's. During the 1970's works of
art emerged as a far superior investment than the securities
markets themselves. From roughly 1960 to 1975, the Dow Jones
industrial average rose approximately 38% in value; a sampling of
French Impressionist works rose 230% during the same period.32
Such astronomical commodity fetishism makes the artworld ripe
for swindlers of many sorts. As artworks further undergo the
transformation from object of aesthetic expression or formal
beauty into a mechanism for increasing wealth, the likelihood of
forgery increases. Most importantly, as this transformation
continues, an understanding of art in its modern sense - as an
object designed for disinterested aesthetic contemplation33 -
diminishes in importance, and specifically legal remedies for
various forms of manipulation and deceit surrounding artworks
will move further and further in the direction of simple protection
of property rights.34 There is no visible alternative to such a
30. Judith M. Nelson, Art Forgery and Copyright Law: Modifying the
Originality Requirement to Prevent the Forging of Artworks, 8 CARDOZO ARTS
AND ENT. L.J. 683, 694 (1990).
31. Id. at 693.
32. Id. at 694.
33. The notion that the work of art should be an object of "disinterested
aesthetic satisfaction" stems from Immanuel Kant, who argued that only by
seeing the work as a non-utilitarian object could an authentic aesthetic judgment
take place. Thus to judge an artwork by its economic value is utterly non-
aesthetic. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 74 - 94 (1975).
34. ADORNO, supra note 3, at 32. The idea that aesthetic contemplation
should be disinterested, and that art should be exempt from the rules and
circumstances of everyday life is a fundamental condition of art in the modem
(post-1800) world. Theodor Adomo characterizes this tendency in the
[Vol. XV: I
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development; as a result, the commodification of art will continue,
codified in the legal mechanism of contemporary life. The irony -
or tragedy, depending upon where one sits - is that it is impossible
in the contemporary art world to look at a painting without
considering the vast sums spent for it; its commercial worth, its
prior owners, and the fights one had to undergo to "acquire" it all
become components of the work's aura. In short, the work's worth
as art has become a function of its worth as commercial object. In
such a context, art and utility, once so profoundly opposed, merge.
C. Nelson Goodman and the Impossibility of the "Perfect Fake"
Among contemporary philosophers of art, few have delved as
deeply into the dynamics of authenticity, reproduction, and fakery
surrounding painting as Nelson Goodman. His work raises
important questions about what is at stake in the very distinction
between original and fake, and in the process, he challenges many
of our easy presumptions about how to perceive a work of art. He
begins, for instance, by pointing out that the question of a certain
kind of forgery - exact reproduction - makes no sense with what
he calls "allographic" works. 5 These are works which are the
product of notation, like music or novels, whose very
reproducibility is part of the essence of their identity as artworks.
There is, says Goodman, no sense in saying that the Chicago
Symphony recently faked a version of Beethoven's Sixth
symphony. Nor is there sense in purchasing the notes of a
particular score by Beethoven as an investment or commodity:
once in the public domain, the work is free for all to "possess" and
use as they see fit. 6
This is not the case with all forms of art, however. Goodman
following cryptic but powerful passage: "[T]he abstractness of modernism is a
provocative challenge to the illusory notion that life still subsists. In addition,
abstraction is a means to achieve the kind of aesthetic distancing which
traditional phantasy no longer provides." THEODOR ADORNO, AESTHETIC
THEORY 32 (1984).
35. NELSON GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART 113 (1976).
36. Id. at 118.
2004]
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also offers the term "autographic" to refer to that class of works
for which a specific "signature" counts.37 More specifically, we
might say that the work's signature is both what uniquely counts
about the work (it carries the artist's specific "touch") and what
guarantees that the particular work is what it claims to be (the
work is authenticated by the signature). Painting, sculpture, and
other plastic and visual arts epitomize autographic works, and thus
their capacity to be faked becomes an important issue.
It may be worthwhile at this point to revisit our hypothetical
situation of an audience of visitors to the Louvre who saw not the
Mona Lisa of Leonardo, but an exact reproduction of the same.
From a strictly formalist perspective, one might conclude that
there was no relevant aesthetic difference between the experience
of the audience on that particular day and the experience of
another audience that had the good fortune to view the real Mona
Lisa (i.e., the Mona Lisa whose pigments were applied by
Leonardo himself).
But Goodman points out that in fact the audiences may well
have had unique experiences, even though they were not aware of
the fact." First, he points out that there is a difference between
"merely looking" at a painting and placing oneself in an "aesthetic
posture" with relation to a painting. It is a fortunate or unfortunate
fact (depending on myriad extraneous factors) that one can acquire
a certain degree of training in perceiving works of art, just as one
can acquire special insights into basketball by watching a number
of games closely, or into rock and roll by listening to early Beatles
albums with special attentiveness and care. Aesthetic perception is
thus distinguished from merely looking; it is, rather, looking from
a specifically aesthetic stance.39
Yet when we are looking at a painting to determine whether it
was in fact painted by Leonardo, we will look for different things
than we might were we looking from an aesthetic perspective.
Obviously, the kind of delight and befuddlement we might
37. Id. at 113.
38. Id. at 115.
39. Id. at 113.
[Vol. XV: I
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experience in considering the expression on the model's face will
be virtually expelled as an element in our reception. Such an
(entirely legitimate) aesthetic response is irrelevant in the context
of looking for the work's authenticity. Second, the kinds of things
we might look for to ascertain the work's genuineness - again, in
contrast to "just" looking - will change the focus of our reception.
Brush-stroke style, pigment thickness, the movement of light in
and through the work, will become evidentiary rather than
aesthetic signifiers. In short, aesthetic reception becomes aesthetic
interrogation.
Ultimately, Goodman concludes that the inquiry into a work's
authenticity may well be unsolvable by aesthetic means.
Something about the identity of the painting may be beyond any
given looking at the painting.4" Consequently, the identity of a
painting may not be found in any discernible aesthetic difference
whatsoever. At this point we find ourselves in the peculiar
position of ceasing to consider the work of art qua work of art and
instead begin to see it as an historical artifact. We have moved, in
short, from the formalist to expressive/historicist perspective. Or
perhaps we have begun to look at an artwork as an element in an
evidentiary puzzle. Indeed, Goodman asks whether our interest in
the lineage of a work has something to do with our peculiar
dependency upon authorship as a principle of understanding. In an
enormously individualist and romantic era, do we need to hang
what we see on the name of a person in order for it to make sense?
Has authorship become more important than the object itself?. Has
art fallen prey to the cult of the celebrity?4
From a legal perspective, Goodman's conclusion makes perfect
sense. Legal considerations about works or art are concerned with
40. Id. at 117.
41. Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY,
PRACTICE 113 (1977). Foucault points out that modern art analyzes works
largely according to what he calls the "author-principle." In such an
environment, names mean more than the raw substance of the work itself. In
Foucault's words: "[T]he 'author-function' is tied to the legal and institutional
discourses... [I]t is not defined by the spontaneous attribution of a text to its
creator, but through a series of precise and complex procedures." Id.
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a characteristic of the work beyond the visual. Such
considerations see the work as property. Thus is the law beyond
the aesthetic. For law to work, it must translate art into an entity
defined in the law's own terms.
D. Kinds and Purposes of Forgery
Although Goodman's analysis raises fascinating aesthetic
questions, it is presented in such a fashion that more common "real
world" situations concerning forgery are understated. Indeed, the
"perfect fake" is a highly unlikely possibility in the case of great
masterpieces, since they generally have quite clear records of
provenance.4" In short, Goodman's hypothetical case is idealized to
such an extent that it moves beyond virtually all of the
circumstances the law is likely to face.
The perfect fake, in fact, is only one member of a class of
forgeries whose essential feature lies in the fact that a work of art's
origin and history is somehow misrepresented. We can identify a
number of different kinds of such misrepresentations:
1. Exact copying: Producing and selling a
reproduction as the original (Goodman's "perfect
fake").
42. There are fascinating exceptions, however. The intentional production of
a perfect fake in the contemporary art world is highly unlikely, largely due to
the massive development of communications capacity in the world of the
information network. Nonetheless, there are examples of artworks purported to
be classical masterpieces whose authenticity are in serious doubt. Georges de la
Tour's The Fortune Teller, a part of the Metropolitan Museum of Art's
collection, is an example of a work whose status as an original or forgery is still
unresolved, despite the work's representation as an authentic masterpiece. A
more playful example is found in Michelangelo's Cupid. After producing the
sculpture, the artist himself decided to attempt to pass the work off as a work in
acidic soil to induce a patina, then shipped the work to Rome where it was sold
as a piece of the classical era. See ANN WALDRON, TRUE OR FALSE? AMAZING
ART FORGERIES 8 -10 (1983).
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2. Completion: Taking the unfinished work of an
artist and completing that work without clear
statement of the fact that the work is not the sole
product of the original artist.
3. Signature or Provenance forgery: Ascribing the
signature of a famous artist to a piece actually
created by someone else, and producing false
records of creation and ownership to support the
false claim.
4. Pastiche: Using various elements from diverse
or unfinished works combining them to create an
artwork with a claim of integrity such that the work
is ascribed to the original artist.43
5. "School" misrepresentation: Attributing the
work of a member of an artist's school (a student of
Rubens, for instance) to the master's hand.
43. Completion and Pastiche forgeries are, interestingly enough, quite
prevalent in literary works of art, particularly in cases where an author dies with
large numbers of unfinished manuscripts on hand. Usually the work of
assembling and publishing such works is left to the executor of the author's
estate. Although such an arrangement is clearly within the bounds of legality, it
has led to important debates among literary scholars about the appropriateness
of issuing such posthumous works, and about the appropriateness of attributing
such works to the dead author. Mark Twain's brooding, melancholy work, The
Mysterious Stranger is virtually a case study of the issue. That work, in a highly
fluid manuscript form (Twain had 3 separate versions of the text in process at
the time of his death), was later published by one of his editors in a remarkably
shortened and bowdlerized version which still circulates today as the
"definitive" edition, despite compelling evidence to the contrary. See MARK
TWAIN'S MYSTERIOUS STRANGER MANUSCRIPTS (William M. Gibson, ed.,
University of California at Berkeley Press) (1969).
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6. Stylistic forgery: Painting a novel image in the
style of another (usually dead) artist and claiming
that the work was a hitherto unknown product of
that artist's hand."
Misrepresentation of one sort or another is the fundamental legal
concern common to all of the types of forgery listed above, an
issue which we shall turn to in the next section. It is important to
note, however, that each of these modes of forgery may have
specific factual peculiarities that make it likely that legal responses
and remedies might vary dramatically depending upon the
circumstances of the case.
Forgery in the strict sense - the intentional deception by artists,
owners, collectors, or dealers concerning the origin and history of
a work - is relatively rare when compared to cases of innocent
misattribution. The latter do not include the element of intent, and
are an ongoing and troubling occurrence in museums throughout
the world. Our concerns here will skirt the particularities of
innocent misattribution, though one should note that many of the
remedies involved will be quite similar whether a
misrepresentation is made innocently or with intention to deceive.
Obviously, the most frequent incentives for art forgery in its
strict sense lie in the hope of financial reward.45 Given the
enormous growth in the value of artworks on the open market, a
talented forger stands ready to earn astronomical sums.46
44. Laurence Scott Bauman, Legal Control of the Fabrication and Marketing
of Fake Paintings, 24 STAN. L. REV., 930, 932 (1972). See also RALPH LERNER
& JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS,
DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 56 (1989). The latter is certainly the best, most
thorough, most sophisticated example of a hombook concerning art law.
45. See HANS TIETZE, GENUINE AND FALSE 9- 17 (1948).
46. The case of David Stein provides a powerful example. Stein was an art
dealer and artist with remarkably chameleon-like talents. At one point he had
produced some forty-one paintings in the style of such artists as Picasso,
Chagall, Matisse, Miro, Bracque and Klee. Ultimately he was arrested and
charged with grand larceny and forgery; while in prison he continued to paint
works "in the style of' his various subjects. The irony of his case is found in the
fact that his works actually gained notoriety and collectibility as a result of his
[Vol. XV: 1
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However, non-monetary motives exist as well, as was seen in the
case of Hans van Meegeren, whose career as a producer of great
fakes in the style of the great 17th century Dutch painter Jan
Vermeer was the product of a desire to wreak revenge upon and
havoc within a critical establishment in the artworld that he found
repulsive. In many ways, van Meergeren was remarkably
successful, and we shall return to his extraordinary tale later.47
E. Non-legal protections from forgery
The best protection from forgery lies in acquiring
unimpeachable guarantees of provenance. The likelihood of this
increases when one purchases artworks from reputable dealers.
Indeed, reputable dealers have made great efforts to guarantee the
propriety of all transactions they conduct.48 Unfortunately, the
world is filled with disreputable dealers who will do their best to
thwart any impulse toward propriety. Furthermore, even the
greatest auction houses may fall prey to accusations of
misrepresentation. Areyh v. Christie's International is a case in
point.49 There, Eskandar Aryeh, a New York businessperson,
purchased a Faberge imperial egg in 1977 for the price of $250,
000-at that time the highest price ever paid for such a work.
Aryeh refused delivery when he began to have doubts about the
egg's authenticity. Christie's provided an additional letter of
certification, but Areyh refused to accept the letter as sufficient
proof of the egg's authenticity and once again refused delivery.
Shortly thereafter, Christie's filed criminal and civil proceedings
against him in Swiss court.
As those proceedings were underway, Christie's provided an
additional letter of certification, this time from A. Kenneth
famous status as grand forger. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 44.
47. See SEPP SCHULLER, FORGERS, DEALERS, EXPERTS 95 - 105 (1960).
48. This includes careful representation of the position a gallery or auction
house holds regarding the authorship and authenticity of a work. See Appendix
A for an example of the types of characterizations a house will affix to a work in
order to allay (or intensify) fears about the work's status.
49. Areyh v. Christie's Int'l, Index no. 1030/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
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Snowman, an internationally renowned expert on Faberge eggs.
Aryeh accepted this certification, and paid Christie's the $250,000
price of the egg as well as $150,000 in legal fees, interest, and
costs. Christie's dropped the suits.
Eight years later, Aryeh decided to sell the egg at Christie's New
York. At the time, an authentic Faberge egg might sell for as
much as $1.6 million. On the eve of the sale, Snowman (the
same expert who had authenticated Aryeh's egg eight years
earlier) revised his opinion and declared the egg inauthentic.
Aryeh immediately brought suit against Christie's claiming that
the 1977 sale was fraudulent, seeking $37 million in damages.
The suit was settled before coming to trial. 1
The point, of course, is that even the best auction houses make
mistakes, some of which are made with less ingenuousness than
others. In Aryeh, the mistakes made were particularly egregious:
the same expert (Snowman) came to radically different
conclusions on two separate occasions, each one in support of the
auction house's interests at the time. The mercenary quality of
both expert and auction house would seem to be evident.
Aryeh is illuminating for another reason. The buyer in that case
was well informed, as evidenced by his initial refusal of delivery.
His case is unique. The vast majority of purchases of artworks are
impulsive, with buyers "shockingly uninformed" about the nature
of the object to be purchased, its provenance, or its physical
condition. 2
The degree to which buyers can be "shockingly uniformed" is
made clear in a 1990 case, Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii,
50. Id. at 88.
51. Lerner and Bresler suggest that Areyh's suit would have succeeded,
largely due to the fact that strong evidence existed pointing to fraudulent
conspiracy on Christie's behalf. Indeed, Snowman himself had issued
uncertainties about the egg's authenticity just prior to the 1977 auction at which
Aryeh had purchased it. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 44, at 59.
52. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 44, at 49. They add: "Defects abound in
artwork as frequently as in other property. Accordingly, the art buyer should
observe the same precautions ordinarily used by the prudent buyer in other
commercial transactions of like value."
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Inc." There, Edward and Helen Balog, non-professional collectors
of art,54 purchased a number of pieces from the Center Art Gallery
in Hawaii; the gallery claimed that the works were either originals
or limited editions by the surrealist painter Salvador Dali. Over a
period of four years, the Balogs spent approximately $36,200 on
seven different works. During that time, the Balogs received
periodic notices entitled "Confidential Appraisal - Certificates of
Authenticity" from the Center Art Gallery, which maintained that
(1) the works were "produced by Dali as exclusive originals or
limited editions," and (2) that the works had appreciated in value
since their purchase by the Balogs. After seeing media reports
questioning the veracity of the claims made by the Center Art
Gallery, and after ascertaining that the artworks they had
purchased had uncertain provenance, the Balogs sued, asserting
breach of express warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code.
The case is interesting for two reasons. First, defendant Center
Art Gallery asserted that the statute of limitations under the U.C.C.
had expired," barring any action by the plaintiffs. The court
53. Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, 745 F. Supp. 1556 (Haw. 1990).
54. Id. at 1556. The court draws explicit attention to the fact that the
plaintiffs in this case "were private collectors but... claim to have no special
expertise regarding the authenticity of the artwork in their collection." Later,
the court adds that the value of the works in question - approximately $36,000 -
rendered extensive authentication of provenance by the buyer both "redundant
and ridiculous," due to the costs such authentication would entail. This holding,
while laudable in many respects, raises extremely difficult questions concerning
definitions and thresholds: What, after all, makes a buyer a "nonexpert?" And
at what point does the value of a work of art become sufficiently substantial to
shift responsibility for authentication from seller to buyer? Compare this case to
Areyh v. Christie, supra note 49, where even the most even-handed and expert
circumstances of both buyer and seller did not eliminate the vexatious
difficulties of forgery, mislabeled, or fake art.
55. U. C. C. § 2-313. Under that section of the Code, "a breach occurs when
tender of delivery is made," and "a cause of action accrues when the breach
occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach."
Under such governing provisions, the statute of limitations would have expired
by the time the Balogs brought their case. However, the next sentence in the
Code adds that the breach upon tender rule is suspended where the warranty
"explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the
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dismissed this claim, holding that even though breach of warranty
occurs under the U.C. C. when tender of delivery is made (that is,
when the non-complying paintings were delivered), the statute was
tolled by the fact that the warranty extended to "future
performance of the goods," and by the fact that discovery of the
breach would necessarily have to "await the time of such
performance."56 The court made a compelling analogy to the wine
collector who purchases 100 cases of a wine held out by the seller
to be of great complexity, from a superior vintage, and thus almost
certain to accrue in value; since the investment value of such a
commodity is maximized by holding it unopened for ten, twenty,
or even thirty years, a breach would only be discovered long after
the statute of limitations has run, thus leaving the aggrieved buyer,
who "discovers that his wine is not Romanee Conti at all, but
Algerian Rouge," without recourse. 7
The court rejected Central Art's plea for dismissal, and it did so
by pointing out that paintings, like wine, are peculiar commodities,
and that the scrutiny they receive under the law must be of a
special order. 8 Since any "test of the promise of authenticity"59 of
such works is often deferred until the moment of a future sale, the
initial buyer must rely on representations by the seller concerning
breach must await the time of such performance."
56. See Balog, 745 F. Supp. 1556 (1990).
57. Id. at 1571.
58. Id. at 1571. The court's stunningly intelligent, if not brilliant, decision
reads as follows:
Since artwork does not 'perform' in the traditional sense of
goods covered by the U.C.C., and since the authenticity of a
work of art, i.e., its 'performance' would not change over
time, Center Art's warranty necessarily guaranteed the present
and future existence of the art as authentic works of Salvador
Dali. To force buyers to secure an additional warranty of
future performance.., would be not only redundant, but
ridiculous .... This is especially the case where, as is often the
situation with art, no test of the promise of authenticity is
expected or required until a future time - namely, the time of
future sale.
Id.
59. Id. at 1571.
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the certification of the artwork. Those representations create an
explicit "warranty of future performance,"6 sufficient to toll the
applicable statute of limitations.6
Second, and most importantly, the court makes an explicit -
though definitionally nebulous - distinction between the kind of
purchasers that one finds in transfers of artworks, resulting in what
would seem to be a two-part analysis. In such circumstances,
where the seller was a dealer in artworks and the buyer was a
nonprofessional "private collector," the court establishes a
standard by which responsibility for discovery of breach rests
almost entirely with the seller, provided the seller had made
affirmations of fact about the artwork that the buyer relied upon. If
such facts exist (in which the description by seller to a
nonprofessional buyer is part of the basis of the bargain), a second
step must take place, in which the relative value of the artwork to
the cost of buyer-funded authentication must take place. In short,
if the artwork in question is not so valuable as to warrant buyer-
financed authentication, responsibility for discovery of the breach
tolls the statute of limitations.62 In the court's words, "where
buyers are sold artwork of such a value that it would be
prohibitively expensive to obtain a verification of authenticity in
addition to the representations of the seller, and where the
merchant is a seller of such artwork, the buyer is justified in
relying on those representations and their claim for breach of
warranty will accrue at the time they discover or reasonably should
have discovered that the artwork was not authentic."63
This is a remarkably consumer-friendly result. And although it
provides important protections for private collectors who have "no
special expertise regarding the authenticity of the artwork in their
collection," the decision raises extremely difficult questions about
the threshold at which such a rule will be invoked. The court does
not establish a standard; it might have said, for instance, that in
sales where the initial sale value of the work of art is more than
60. Id. at 1571.
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four times (or five, or six) the cost of securing additional
certification, the buyer is required to do so to ensure protection
under U.C.C. 2-3 13. In short, although the decision of the District
Court is in this instance quite laudable, the application of their
methodology for determining where and how this new rule will
apply makes its future cloudy at best. The "non-expert" collector
would be wise to use all methods possible to guarantee provenance
well in advance of purchase - in short, via non-legal, private
means.
F. Methods of authentication
When suspicions about the provenance or authenticity of an
artwork arise, three basic courses of action are available to the
concerned party. The first, and most obvious, is to re-evaluate the
documentation concerning the work. Unfortunately,
documentation is more easily forged than the work itself,6 and can
thus be an extremely unreliable method for assuring authenticity.
A second method of verification is termed "stylistic" inquiry. In
such instances an expert in the particular field, or someone with
exceptional knowledge regarding the stylistic dynamics of the
artist in question reviews the work at hand. Often this entails some
degree of comparative analysis: A work from the painter's past is
compared to the questioned work in the hope of detecting any
anomalies in brushstroke technique, foundation structure, and the
like. A classic example is found in brushstroke analysis of the
Otto Wacker gallery's Reaper in a Cornfield by Van Gogh.65 In
that case, a number of Van Gogh experts had immediate suspicions
about the authenticity of the work, confirmed by a comparison of
minor style differences. The conclusion - that the work was a
forgery - was proven further by scientific analysis.
There are vast difficulties with stylistic analysis, however, which
we shall turn to in our discussion of Hans van Meegeren below.
64. LERNER & BRESSLER, supra note 44, at 57.
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Most importantly, however, stylistic analysis is a classic example
of a subjective test. It rests on the particular status and stance of
the expert in question. Such a mode of analysis thus carries with it
all the inherent difficulties of such tests in the other areas of law
and criticism - most importantly, the likelihood of bias or
nonuniversalizable conclusions.
The third method of analysis is scientific. Such analysis is often
used in addition to, or in conjunction with, the subjective analysis
described above (such was the case in the Otto Wacker/Van Gogh
forgeries). The greatest virtue of such a mode of analysis is its
objectivity: results are inherently universalizable and thus subject
to absolute verification by other, identically situated testing
methods. Tests may also be targeted to specific characteristics of
the artwork itself. Radiocarbon dating, for instance, can help
establish differences in the age and nature of the materials used,
and in the artist's technique, that may betray a forger's hand.
The difficulty with all of these methods is they are both
expensive and logistically difficult to undertake. The unfortunate
result is that a number of forged artworks continue to go
undetected in various art sales, with each additional transfer
increasing the difficulty of exposing their fraudulence.
III. LEGAL PROTECTION AND REMEDIES CONCERNING FORGERY
AND MISREPRESENTATION
A number of different areas of law are applicable to questions
surrounding misrepresentation, fraud, or mistake in the sale of
artworks. The most obvious and well-established relevant law is
found in common law rules pertaining to contract, particularly as
they are codified in the Uniform Commercial Code. In addition,
buyers unfairly injured in an art sales transaction may find useful
legal recourse in tort law,66 Federal and State Penal statutes
66. An in-depth discussion of tort remedies is beyond the scope of this
particular analysis, although a defrauded or misled purchaser would be well
advised to look into this avenue as a means of recovery. Such a strategy would
aim at proving professional malpractice as a result of some degree of negligence
in any area surrounding the sale. In addition, such claims as breach of fiduciary
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(particularly in cases where intent to deceive or defraud is present),
67and in legislation enacted in specific jurisdictions where sales are
particularly prevalent in commercial transactions. 68 New York
State and California, for instance, have both enacted business laws
aimed at insuring the propriety of sales involving artworks.69
The Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter, U.C.C.) is the most
important legal instrument for insuring the propriety of
transactions involving artworks. Section 1-203 of the Code
mandates good faith in the creation and execution of any sales
contract."0 In addition, it provides a site from which to compel
restitution in the event of a faulty sale. Unfortunately, the fact that
the U.C.C. covers only transactions of tangible personal property
entails that certain types of artwork will not be governed by it.
Environmental art, for instance, is not "personal property" of the
sort envisioned under the U.C.C.7" Furthermore, the degree to
which the characteristics of an artwork are "tangible" in a
traditional commercial sense is highly uncertain. This is
particularly the case given the enormous volatility of price and
prestige accorded various artists and artworks in different periods.
In their hornbook entitled Art Law, Lerner and Bressler cite
three basic ways in which express warranties may be created:
warranty by affirmation of fact or promise; warranty by
description; statements of opinion by an art merchant (a merchant
dealing in goods of that kind).72
duty, financial conflict of interest, and defamation or disparagement are
plausible additional means of correcting the harm caused by a faulty sale. See
Steven Mark Levy, Liability of the Art Expert for Professional Malpractice,
1991 Wis. L. REv. 595 (1991).
67. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 44, at 58.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 90.
70. U.C.C. § 1-203.
71. Environmental art is one of many novel forms developed in
contemporary or postmodem art. This form utilizes existing geographical
conditions and various types of artistic embellishment to create an artistic scene
- as in the case of Christo's "Running Fence" (a white cloth fence running for
miles along the northern California landscape).
72. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 44, at 59-61.
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In addition, they suggest the following two methods for the
creation of an implied warranty: warranty of merchantability;
warranty of fitness for a particular use.73
What follows will survey the applicability of each of these forms
of warranty arising under the U.C.C. as applied to artworks.
A. Express Warranties under U. C.C. 2-313
The U.C.C. offers powerful mechanisms to discourage
misrepresentation in the case of paintings. It also provides means
for restitution in the event of a faulty sale. More specifically,
U.C.C. 2-3 13 provides an automatic presumption that the sale in
question is conducted in accordance with "any affirmation of fact
or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain. . ." A
representation which becomes a part of the basis of the bargain
may manifest itself in an "affirmation of fact or promise,"75 a mere
"description" of the goods76 (as in, "this is a fine example of
Rauschenberg's early work"), or even in "statements of opinion"
by the seller.77
The last mechanism for generating a warranty is particularly
troubling and dangerous for art dealers. What a dealer thinks is
"mere opinion" rises to the level of warranty of authenticity if the
dealer is an art merchant." From a legal perspective, what matters
is whether the seller is someone who ordinarily deals in goods of
the kind. This supports the general tenor of U.C.C. provisions,
which aim at protecting the sanctity and fairness of business
dealings. When an art dealer (who in principal has greater
knowledge concerning the goods in question) makes a
representation about a painting, it rises to the level of factual
claim. The kind of puffing one sees on an automobile sales lot has
73. Id. at 64-9.
74. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a).
75. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 44, at 60.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 61.
78. U.C.C. § 2-313, note 8; U.C.C. § 2-103.
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no place in the transfer of artwork.
Furthermore, disclaimers have no effect unless they are clearly
and prominently displayed, and the dealer has made no assertion
of authenticity. Hence a dealer who purported to sell a Picasso
lithograph would give rise to an express or implied warranty which
would be unaffected by the attachment of disclaimer. The
rationale of the U.C.C. is simple: contracts of sale should be made
within relatively uniform commercial circumstances; these
circumstances imply relatively full disclosure of all pertinent facts
to the parties involved.79 Disclaimers serve to undermine such a
covenant, and, in the language of U.C.C. 2-313, are "repugnant"
and without effect save in extremely limited circumstances."
A number of important consequences flow from the various
provisions attached to U.C.C. Section 2-313. First, for an express
warranty to spring into existence, there must be a core description
of the goods to be sold8 which becomes part of the "basis of the
bargain" itself.82 Moreover, an express warranty may be created
regardless of the seller's intention to make such a warranty.83 Thus
when a dealer or gallery84 makes representations about an artwork,
and those representations are part of the basis of the bargain
between seller and buyer, an express warranty will arise.
Moreover, if a "merchant" makes in good faith an assertion that
turns out to be false, an action will still lie; in short, good faith is
no defense to a false assertion. Thus as express warranty may
arise in any number of representations found in the ordinary course
of business revolving around transactions of art: documents,
brochures, catalogs, advertisements, even announcements, may
79. U.C.C. § 2-313, note 1.
80. Id.
81. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(b).
82. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a).
83. U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
84. U.C.C. § 2-104 defines "merchant" as a person who deals in goods of the
kind (here, a painting or similar artwork), or as one who by her occupation holds
herself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction.
85. U.C.C. § 2-313(2); See also Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, Inc., 669
F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1982).
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give rise to a warranty under U.C.C. 2-313.
The precise time when affirmations about an artwork are made
is not material in establishing an express warranty.86 In other
words, a warranty may arise from oral representations about the
quality of a work made prior to, during, or after a sale. The
fundamental standard is that of good faith and fair dealing. The
latter point - comments made after a sale - deserves special
notice. For instance, a representation made after a sale by a dealer
can give rise to increased liability in the form of a warranty.
B. Implied Warranties under UC. C. 2-314
An implied warranty of merchantability springs into existence
when the goods in question (here again, a painting) are purchased
from a seller who is a "merchant with respect to goods of that
kind.""7 An art dealer is such a merchant, and her sale of an
artwork implies in relevant part that the artwork sold will meet the
following conditions:
1. It will "pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description.""8
2. It is fit for the "ordinary purposes" such works are put to.89
3. It will "confirm to the promise or affirmations of fact made
on the ... label."90
The effect of these provisions is not hard to determine in the
case of artworks. Once a sale is made, any objection to a work's
authenticity (by a future buyer or third-party, or instance) will
suggest that a breach has occurred.9 Further, "ordinary purposes"
86. U.C.C. § 2-313, note 7.
87. U.C.C. § 2-314(1).
88. U.C.C. § 2-314(1)(a).
89. U.C.C. § 2-314(l)(c).
90. U.C.C. § 2-314(1)(f).
91. In theory and in general practice, this is a non-problematic assertion.
Dealer A sells a work to buyer B, who is then told that the work is inauthentic,
or that its certification is faulty. B has a straightforward cause of action against
A. Why? Because the work would not "pass without objection" under the
circumstances of ordinary trade practices. But some fakes (as in the case of van
Meegeren's Vermeer works) pass for some time in the trade without objection.
2004]
29
Clark: The Perfect Fake: Creativity, Forgery, Art and the Law
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART. & ENT. LAW
can be construed broadly. Aesthetic enjoyment is not the outer
limit of such ordinary usage; part of the ordinary purpose of an
artwork is as an investment, and this property of the work is
protected under U.C.C. Sec. 2-314. Finally, "label" in this context
may be read as "certificate of provenance." A faulty certificate,
even if its inaccuracy is unknown to the merchant-seller, does not
alleviate the merchant's warranty obligation. Case law has shown
that inquiries into the validity of title are part of an art dealer's
ordinary course of business. Hence a dealer has a duty to ascertain
the status of title of any work she sells.92
C. Circumstances in which Breach Occurs
If a buyer purchases an artwork on the strength of affirmations
which provide the basis of the bargain, and the goods in question
ultimately fail to conform, a breach of express warranty has
occurred.93 The buyer may bring suit regardless of whether the
seller acted in good faith or with malicious intent (though the latter
might give rise to criminal action for fraudulent
Galleries and art merchants have attempted to protect themselves from the
consequences of implied warranties by making explicit representations of the
degree of certainty with which they endorse (1) the artwork's authenticity; (2)
the artwork's provenance; and (3) the certainty of the work's certification. The
effect of such disclaimers (acceptable under 2-314 if the buyer is afforded full
opportunity to examine the goods in question and the defect is visible by such
means of examination) is to alleviate the exposure of the merchant-seller to
liability under the implied warranty sections of the U.C.C., and to increase the
risk confronted by the buyer. See U.C.C. § 2-316, Comment 8; see also LERNER
& BRESLER, supra note 44, at 69.
92. See Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1979) afd, 53 N.Y.2d 696
(1981). In this case, the bizarre circumstances that surrounded the consignment
of a painting owned by Porter to an individual posing as Wertz, who then sold
the painting to the Feigen gallery, led to the court's ruling in support of Porter's
action both intermediary and gallery. The gallery was held to be operating
outside the standard commercial standards applicable at the time - particularly
in its failure to inquire who sold the painting - and was ordered to reimburse
Porter (the original owner) the value of the painting at the time of sale, plus
costs.
93. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 44, at 60.
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misrepresentation). This applies as well to cases where a work
which is likely to be authentic is affixed with forged
documentation to further allay any fears about authenticity. In
such a case the mere fact of inauthentic documentation might
render the pedigree of the work questionable. The seller may be
forced to reimburse the buyer for an diminution in value stemming
form the faulty certification (potentially a massive sum); or he may
be forced to compensate the buyer for any costs incurred in
assuring certification; or, finally, he may be subject to punitive
damages in the event that he acted in bad faith.
The crucial issues for both buyer and seller of artworks are that a
warranty of genuineness is presumed in the very fabric of the sale.
This is underscored by Note 8 to U.C.C. Sec. 2-313: "What
statements of the seller have in the circumstances and in objective
judgment become part of the basis of the bargain? As indicated
above, all of the statements of the seller do so unless good reason
is shown to the contrary." In this context, "good reason" would
probably entail no less than a written disclaimer by an established
expert in the field. Hence an art merchant is cautioned that
standards for "puffing" legitimate to the used auto market are
simply inapplicable in the transfer of "autographic" artworks.9"
Other protections are available under the U.C.C., but they are
beyond the scope of this paper. The general fact is that protections
and remedies exist under the U.C.C. for a variety of transactional
elements which are present in the sale of an artwork. In sum, the
U.C.C. provides express and implied warranties applicable to a
number of the sale characteristics of an artwork, including those of
title, fitness for ordinary use, fitness for a particular use,
merchantability, and conformity to representations made before,
during, and after a sale. The purchaser of an autographic artwork
would be wise to create a checklist with the U.C.C. in mind;
indeed, a wise purchaser would ask that the merchant or non-
merchant dealer agree in writing to conform to the requirements
of such a list. Such a practice would alleviate uncertainty from
both ends of the seller-purchaser dynamic, and would certainly be
94. U.C.C. § 2-313, note 8.
2004]
31
Clark: The Perfect Fake: Creativity, Forgery, Art and the Law
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J. ART. & ENT. LAW
a contract into which a reputable art dealer would enter without
hesitation.
D. New York Business Law
New York's position as a world center for the sale of major
artworks has led to its passage of statutes aimed specifically at
regulating the art market. Such laws have come to serve as litmus
tests for the validity of a transfer and have been emulated by other
states, most notably Michigan, Illinois, and California.95 Sales that
fail to meet the standards established by New York law are
generally held with great suspicion in other large art markets.96
Two areas of New York law are of specific importance here.
The first specifically concerns forgery, and follows general laws
prohibiting the intentional falsification or creation of written
documents like checks, promissory notes, and the like. Such laws
have been modified for specific application to the artworld and are
generally referred to as "criminal-simulation statutes." These
statutes provide criminal penalties for the intentional production or
modification of any object such that its age, uniqueness or
authorship is falsely represented.97 Although such statutes may
serve to discourage fraudulent misrepresentation, the astronomical
sums available to the unscrupulous art dealer tend to blunt their
effect. Furthermore, the utility of such penal statutes to the
defrauded buyer or seller are negligible; more effective remedies
are found in U.C.C. provisions and tort law. Finally, the criminal
intent requirement of N.Y. Penal Law 170.45 creates proof issues
95. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 44, at 92.
96. Id. at 93.
97. The specific language of the statute reads as follows:
A person is guilty of criminal simulation when: 1) With intent
to defraud, he makes or alters any object in such manner that
it appears to have antiquity, rarity, source or authorship which
it does not in fact possess; or 2) With knowledge of its true
character and with intent to defraud, he utters or possesses an
object so simulated. Criminal simulation is a class A
misdemeanor.
N.Y. Penal Law Sec. 170.45 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1988).
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that maybe extremely difficult to meet in the often nebulous and
arcane world of international art sales.
A second New York law may prove more useful in guaranteeing
the authenticity and propriety of transfers of painting. These
statutes work to extend and underscore the express warranty
requirements found in U.C.C. 2-313. In essence, any written
instrument involved in the transfer of an artwork will result in the
creation of an express warranty of authenticity. Such warranties
are intended to be unaffected by any disclaimer. Finally, the
opinion of a seller becomes a factual element of the bargain:
"puffing" rises to the level of material fact.98
IV. HANS VAN MEEGEREN: FORGERY FOR OTHER THAN FINANCIAL
ENDS
The foregoing analyses would be incomplete without a brief
discussion of the stunning case of Hans van Meegeren's forgery of
the works of Jan Vermeer. Van Meegeren's case crystallizes many
of the legal issues surrounding the faulty or misrepresentational
transfer of artworks, but it also reiterates many of the questions
raised earlier about contemporary relationships of the audience to
an artwork. In van Meegeren's case, we find the question of art
qua art posed once again.
Van Meegeren, while commercially employed as an illustrator
and decorative artist, entertained the perfectly legitimate wish that
his work be received with some degree of appreciation by the
high-critical elements of the Dutch artistic community. Early in
his career, the critical community saw his works with promise; in
particular, his technical skill was deemed remarkable.
Unfortunately, his work was increasingly seen as lacking
"psychological penetration."99 One critic referred to his work as
combining a "unique, fluid way of painting" with "insipid and
sweet, sometimes miserably forsaken" images.00  Such
98. N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law Sec. 13.01 (McKinney 1984 and Supp.
1988).
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disappointments led to his decision, sometime during the late
1920's, to prove two things: First, the pomposity and fraudulence
of the world of art experts; and second, his own status as a brilliant
painter. "'
To this end van Meegeren produced nine of the greatest
forgeries in the history of Western art. He chose to create works
so intimately in the style of Pietr de Hooch and Jan Vermeer that
they would be received as authentic "undiscovered" paintings by
the masters. One of his works, "Christ and the Disciples at
Emmaus" was hailed by J. Decoen, a leading expert on the work of
Vermeer, as Vermeer's greatest accomplishment, done in a style
that would demand a rethinking of the entirety of that painter's
corpus. °2 The quality of his forgeries was so great that the
European critical community refused to believe van Meergeren's
claims even after he admitted his fraud. Indeed, even after the trial
was completed, and after van Meegeren had created another
painting "in the style of' Vermeer to prove his culpability, some
critics continued to doubt that all of the works were forgeries.
Decoen, the critic alluded to earlier, uttered the following while
van Meegeren's sentence was being determined:
I must recall that the moment of greatest anguish
for me was when the verdict [of van Meegeren] was
being considered. The court might, according to an
ancient Dutch Law, have ordered the destruction of
all the pictures. One shudders at the thought that
one could, officially, have destroyed two of the
most moving works which Vermeer has created."3
Van Meegeren's tale continued still further: In the 1950's a
group of critics, still unconvinced that the stylistic analysis
employed by the Dutch court in determining that the works were
forgeries, sought to show that at least two of the paintings were
101. Id.atll.
102. Id. at 22.
103. Id. at 61.
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authentic. These efforts - so illuminative of the enormous
importance of "authenticity" as an element in determining the
validity of an artwork - were finally laid to rest by radiographic
analysis, which concluded that the works were in fact produced in
the 2 0 th century.0 4
Van Meegeren's ironic and sad end tells much about
ineluctability and enigmatic character of art. Depressed and
battered by his court case, van Meegeren died in prison at the age
of 58. His works-both his forgeries and his original works -
have gained status and commercial value as a result of their
exposure as frauds. Perhaps in van Meegeren's case the raw fact of
art expresses itself in pure form: In his work, questions about
authenticity, originality, and beauty emerge, and art presents itself
in its enigmatic, unknowable character.
104. Id. at 20.
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